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Mary Wollstonecraft, Freedom and the Enduring Power of Social Domination 
Alan M. S. J. Coffee 
Forthcoming in the European Journal of Political Theory (2012) 
Draft: Do not cite without approval 
Abstract: 
Even long after their formal exclusion has come to an end, members of previously oppressed 
social groups often continue to face disproportionate restrictions on their freedom, as the 
experience of many women over the last century has shown. Working within a republican 
framework which understands freedom as independence from arbitrary power, Mary 
Wollstonecraft provides an explanation of why such domination may persist and offers a 
model through which it can be addressed. Republicans rely on processes of rational public 
deliberation to highlight and combat oppression. However, where domination is primarily 
social rather than legal or political (such as where cultural attitudes, traditions and values 
exert an arbitrary and inhibiting force) then this defence against domination is often negated. 
Prejudice, she argues, ‘clouds’ people’s ability to reason and skews debate in favour of the 
dominant powers, thereby entrenching patterns of subjection. If they are to be independent, 
then, citizens require not only political rights but a platform from which to add their 
perspectives and interests to the background social values which govern political discussion. 
Keywords: feminism, freedom, independence, non-domination, republicanism, voice, 
Wollstonecraft 
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Mary Wollstonecraft, Freedom and the Enduring Power of Social Domination 
Servitude not only debases the individual, but its effects seem to be 
transmitted to posterity. 
Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman.
1
 
I 
‘In all history’ wrote W. E. B. Du Bois in 1904, more than forty years after emancipation, 
‘slavery has usually been followed by a period of semi-slavery or serfdom.’2 By this, he 
meant that the oppressed population is ‘curtailed in personal liberty, is insecure in life and 
property, has peculiar difficulty in earning a decent living, has almost no voice in its own 
government, does not enjoy adequate educational facilities, and suffers, no matter what its 
ability or desert, discount, impertinence and contempt.’ More than a century later, many of 
these barriers to freedom remain in place. Over a similar period, women, too, have emerged 
from a position of formal subjection – from having no political vote or independent 
representation before the law, for example, or by losing all their property rights upon 
marriage – to gain a series of hard-won freedoms and rights though which they have an equal 
civic status. Nevertheless, even now many women face a similar range of obstacles to those 
listed by Du Bois. The tendency for the aftereffects of slavery to linger on even after formal 
equality has been achieved, has long been a source of concern for political theorists 
preoccupied with the idea of securing the benefits of citizenship for all members of a political 
community on equal and fair terms. However, while Du Bois admitted to being unsure 
whether this persistence in ‘semi-servitude’ was a necessary part of the process of gaining 
freedom or an indication that liberation had not gone far enough, Mary Wollstonecraft shows 
clearly that it is the result of an incomplete emancipation. 
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The reality of servitude can, of course, take many forms and there are important 
differences between the chattel slavery of the American plantations, the historic subjection of 
women to male authority, and social exclusion or economic marginalization within modern 
democracies. Within republican political theory, however, a common principle links all these 
various forms of oppression and classes them as ‘slavery’ in a particular sense. 3 In each case, 
the dominated party is understood to be ruled arbitrarily, by which is meant that they are 
exposed to a form of controlling power in virtue of which others are able to disregard their 
perspectives and override their status as persons who act for themselves, sui iuris. For 
republicans, then, the idea of slavery connotes not primarily chains or coercion, but a 
comparative lack of power and status in relation to others.
4
 Although everyone in society is 
subject to some form of external power, such as being under the law, ‘free’ individuals are 
not ruled arbitrarily because they are recognized as independent agents. They are full 
members of a political community whose laws are required to represent their interests. They 
also have a voice in determining those laws and are able to contest and challenge interference 
in their lives that does not meet the conditions of non-arbitrariness. Under these conditions, 
free citizens are said to act in their own right. Those who are designated as ‘slaves’, by 
contrast, find themselves exposed to the discretionary, or arbitrary, will of those who may 
have more power than they. They are not immune from unwarranted intrusion and have, at 
best, a limited voice in determining the terms of their social participation. To this extent, the 
term slave refers generically to those who are not treated as agents who act in their own right 
and are, thereby, dominated. Where people fear for the security of their person, property or 
jobs, as Du Bois suggests, they are dominated by those who have power over them in respect 
of these things.  
Domination may be legal or political, such as where individuals are treated unequally 
under the law or lack important constitutional rights and representation.
5
 As we shall see, 
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Wollstonecraft shows that domination may also be social. Insofar as individuals’ social 
environment represents arbitrary restrictive force – where norms and customs are not required 
to reflect their interests and perspectives, inhibiting and diminishing the effectiveness of their 
voices and reducing their ability to act as agents in their own right – they are dominated 
irrespective of their legal standing.  
In analyzing dependence as having both political and social causes, Wollstonecraft 
highlights an important reason as to why patterns of domination have a tendency to persist for 
generations. And amongst her many significant arguments, we can identify a specific reason 
why social domination can be much more damaging and difficult to remove than political 
domination which should be of interest to contemporary republicans. Republicans rely on 
public reason and rational deliberation as a fundamental defence against domination which 
both allows individuals to challenge instances of arbitrary power whilst enabling the citizenry 
collectively to establish and maintain non-arbitrary laws which reflect their common 
interests.
6
 Within any political community, it is argued, certain considerations come to be 
generally accepted as being relevant for discussing and resolving matters of public concern. 
This consensus provides the context in which political deliberation inevitably takes place. 
Where there is social domination, Wollstonecraft shows, the appeal to public reason may be 
seriously undermined. Inequality and dependence corrupt the ability of citizens, both 
dominant and dominated alike, to reason dispassionately in their relations and public 
dealings. Debate and political activity, she argues, become governed by opinion, tradition and 
vested interests rather than by rationally grounded considerations. As a result, the 
considerations and ideas which are accepted as constituting public reasons come to be set by 
the dominant groups. This dampens, and may even negate, the effect of reasoned argument as 
an impartial check against domination. Instead, debate is conducted on terms which are 
biased towards the incumbent powers within society.  
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My primary interest is in how the philosophical principle of freedom as independence 
from arbitrary rule can address the problem of social domination. In pursing this question, I 
shall confine myself to exploring this issue in the light of Wollstonecraft’s work. (And in so 
doing, I refer only to Wollstonecraft’s use of a republican framework in addressing the 
subject of women’s subjection rather than offering a full account of her ideas about gender in 
society). Broadly speaking, I understand the republican ideal in terms of freedom as non-
domination as articulated in contemporary terms by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner.
7
 Both 
Pettit and Skinner, as well as others working within this paradigm such as Lena Halldenius, 
place Wollstonecraft within the eighteenth century Commonwealthman period of rational 
dissent, alongside figures such as Richard Price and Joseph Priestly who have been shown to 
use the notion of freedom as non-domination.
8
 However, although Wollstonecraft is often 
cited with approval by these writers and used to illustrate republican freedom, with the 
notable exception of Halldenius they have not explicitly examined the implications for 
republicanism of Wollstonecraft’s understanding of freedom and slavery.9 Wollstonecraft’s 
analysis of the oppressive nature of gendered relations, picking out what had been previously 
hidden forms of male domination, has justifiably been celebrated in its own right. However, 
she provides more than a sociological account of power relations. Her work also represents 
an innovative use of the core idea that freedom indicates the absence of arbitrary rule. Others 
before her had acknowledged the effect of social and cultural norms in reinforcing slavery.
10
 
Where Wollstonecraft’s diagnosis differs from her predecessors’, as I shall show, is that she 
takes social oppression to inhibit freedom for the same reasons as the denial of legal or 
political rights: women are under a form of arbitrary rule, are excluded from having their 
interests and perspectives considered and are unable to contest their treatment in any ‘court of 
public opinion.’ While the traditional focus of republican argument had been on preventing 
arbitrary interference by rulers (who might, for example, dominate via taxation without 
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representation or the royal prerogative), or on discouraging the accumulation of political and 
economic power in the hands of a few, Wollstonecraft demonstrates that, as far as women 
were concerned, these measures would never bring freedom without a simultaneous change 
in the cultural attitudes and patterns of behaviour (both male and female) that prevented 
women from becoming independent.  
While I believe that an appreciation of the formal structure of freedom as 
independence from arbitrary power can augment existing Wollstonecraft scholarship, 
especially regarding her discussions of slavery,
11
 I do not claim that this is the only way to 
read Wollstonecraft, nor that republican influences should be privileged amongst the many 
other sources upon which she drew. Barbara Taylor, for example, has highlighted the 
‘religious foundations of Wollstonecraft’s feminism,’ emphasizing the importance of her 
puritan and dissenting associations, whilst Daniel O’Neill situates her vigorous exchange 
with Edmund Burke in the context of ideas about democracy and civilization derived from 
the Scottish Enlightenment.
12
 It is not my intention here to demonstrate from first principles 
that Wollstonecraft was herself committed to a conception of what would now be called 
freedom as non-domination.
13
 Rather, since Wollstonecraft does clearly use the language of 
freedom, independence and slavery, my aim is to draw out the implications this has for 
republicans notwithstanding the subtleties of her overall position. In order to do this, I shall 
first outline some of the key features of the Commonwealthman understanding of freedom, 
showing how this is reflected in Wollstonecraft work, before going on to apply this to the 
question of social domination and the enduring pattern of servitude. 
II 
Classically, republican freedom was understood as an intersubjective ideal in which citizens 
are related to one another as independent agents.
14
 Freedom is connected with two other 
ideals: equality and virtue.
15
 Independent agents are said to be equal where none is able to 
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exercise arbitrary power over another, and each has the same standing under law. They are 
also expected to behave virtuously, by which is meant to be guided by reason rather than by 
opinion or passion.
16
 (Indeed, as Wollstonecraft understands it, virtue is the only true form of 
freedom: ‘it is the right use of reason alone which makes us independent of everything – 
excepting the unclouded reason – ‘whose service is perfect freedom.’’)17 Whilst virtue is 
demanded of independent agents, so independence is said to be a precondition of virtue. This 
is the basic framework we find in Richard Price’s writings. He describes individuals as being 
free to the extent that they are ‘subject to no control from the arbitrary will of any of their 
fellow-citizens.’18 Price links this idea of freedom with both equality and virtue, observing 
that the maxim ‘‘that all men are naturally equal’ refers to their state when grown up to 
maturity and become independent agents, capable of acquiring property, and of directing their 
own conduct’ and that freedom is ‘inseparable from knowledge and virtue.’19  Independence 
requires that people are not ruled arbitrarily rather than that they are not ruled at all. So long 
as citizens are subject to laws which are required to reflect the shared interests of the people 
who are governed by it and must treat all citizens as agents, such that nobody is above the 
law and yet no one falls below its protection, then their independence will not have been 
compromised.
20
 Such non-arbitrary rule is concerned with the common good, leaving 
independent individuals free to direct their personal affairs without being answerable to 
others.
21
  
Since freedom is understood within a structure of coercive but non-arbitrary power 
that reflects the common good, a considerable and on-going input is required from the 
citizens themselves to ensure that these conditions are not breached. In order to ensure that 
everybody’s perspectives on the common interest are taken into account, the state must be 
accountable to its citizens.
22
 Historically, two main defences of freedom have been identified. 
The first is the virtue of the citizens, represented by their ability and readiness to promote and 
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maintain the conditions of freedom by being guided by reason rather than self-interest. The 
second is their voice. Government, says Price, ‘is or is not liberty, just as the laws are just or 
unjust; and as the body of people do or do not participate in the power of making them.’23 
The state is nothing more than the body of people who make it up, and for it to govern in 
their name, it must respond to their opinions and ideas about how they want to live. Each 
individual has a voice in how the affairs of the community are run which they are expected to 
use virtuously and with restraint.
24 
 
Wollstonecraft also uses the language of independence, equality and virtue when 
talking about freedom and its antonym, slavery. In the opening paragraph of the dedication to 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, independence is described as ‘the basis of every 
virtue’ with slavery cast a few pages later as dependence.25 And in the first chapter she 
establishes that independence requires equality.
26
 However, while women possess the 
prerequisite for virtue – they partake in the ‘gift of reason’ along with men – they do not have 
the opportunity to for independence.
27
 Men’s power over women is, therefore, arbitrary and 
women are said to be slaves.
28
 Lack of equality or opportunity for independence, however, do 
more than simply deprive women of freedom. Arbitrary power in whatever form, even where 
it is well-intentioned, is regarded as inherently corrupting, undermining the capacity of both 
master and slave alike to develop the capacity and character to act virtuously.
29
 By preventing 
individuals from reasoning impartially and seeing their situation for what it is, patterns of 
domination entrench themselves and become difficult to dislodge. In the first chapter of the 
Vindication, Wollstonecraft sets out the reasons for this in classically republican terms.
30
 
These principles form the basis of her analysis and criticism of gendered patterns of social 
relationships in the rest of the book (although in section IV we shall examine a separate and 
more innovative observation regarding the corrupting effect of arbitrary power).  
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The argument in chapter one is this. Although human beings are moved by their 
passions and emotions, through reason and virtue we are able to translate our experiences into 
knowledge.
31
 Through collective deliberation, individuals share their discoveries with each 
other so that the community grows in understanding and is able to generate ‘laws which bind 
society.’ Wisdom and knowledge, however, do not come easily. It takes discipline, training 
and intellectual courage to free oneself from the prejudices and falsehoods with which one 
has grown up and to overcome the impulse to be swayed by passion and self-interest.
32
 
Individuals require an appropriate environment to develop the robust character necessary for 
virtuous, independent citizenship. Dependence impedes this development. If I am to be 
virtuous, then, I must be independent. Importantly, I must also live within a community of 
independent agents. While virtuous people are able to act in accordance with reason and the 
public good, putting aside their own self-interest when appropriate, slaves do not have this 
luxury because they are dependent on the goodwill of others. Slaves’ primary motivation is to 
manage those who have power over them. They might do this by manipulating things behind 
the scene or by lying low, hoping not to be noticed. Dependence, then, rewards qualities 
regarded as unvirtuous, such as timidity, cunning, trickery, and sycophancy. Slaves also 
become used to accepting the opinions of others rather than questioning what they have been 
told and coming to their own reasoned judgements.
33
 Masters, on the other hand, grow 
accustomed to insincere adulation which prevents them from facing up to hard truths and 
building their own virtuous characters. Their opinion of themselves is inflated, their skills are 
often underdeveloped because they have become lazy, and they lack the self-discipline to 
regulate their appetites in the name of morality.
34
    
In hierarchical societies, most people are involved in relationships in which they are, 
in turn, dominant and subordinate. As individuals ingratiate themselves with those above 
them, so they become despotic to those below (a pattern into which married men of any rank 
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are liable to slip). People become doubly corrupt, both ‘submitting and tyrannising without 
exercising their reason,’ becoming dead-weights on the community.35 Rather than advancing 
society’s ends by developing useful skills, people fritter their time away pandering to 
extravagant fops and feathering their own nests. Only when the stranglehold of dependence is 
broken, she argues, will capable individuals emerge to ‘scatter seeds that grow up and have a 
great influence on the forming opinion,’ adding that ‘once the public opinion preponderates, 
through the exertion of reason, the overthrow of arbitrary power is not very distant.’36 
Wollstonecraft illustrates her claims with the examples of monarchy, standing armies, and the 
clergy as institutions which encourage flattery and luxury rather than character and virtue.
37
 
In later chapters, she includes the arbitrary rule of husbands over wives.
38
  
If dependence is to be avoided, the law rather than the capricious whim of powerful 
individuals must be sovereign. Everybody must have the opportunity to challenge and 
overturn the arbitrary use of power when it arises.
39
 Since the law as a whole must reflect the 
considered will and interests of the population over which it is sovereign, Wollstonecraft 
argues that a culture of open, vigorous and penetrating debate is required in order to broaden 
people’s minds and equip them to pursue the knowledge necessary for identifying and 
upholding the common good (‘to consult the public mind in a perfect state of civilization, will 
not only be necessary, but it will be productive of the happiest consequences, generating a 
government emanating from the sense of the nation.’)40 The discussion of politics, she 
believes, ‘enlarges the heart by opening the understanding,’ preventing social stagnation.41  
We should note, finally, that despite her emphasis on debate and public consultation, 
Wollstonecraft’s conception of freedom under the law is not restricted to what is often termed 
the public, as opposed to the private, sphere. The same conditions for independence apply 
within the home as in the public arena. Indeed, marriage, as it was practised then, represented 
a paradigm case of a dominating relationship. While is now widely accepted that 
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independence should not be restricted to the public sphere,
42
 in Wollstonecraft’s time there 
was a rigid cultural distinction between the (male) duties of public citizenship and the 
(female) responsibilities for domestic motherhood. The latter were seen as being inherently 
dependent.
43
 It was part of her innovative use of the principle of freedom as non-domination 
that Wollstonecraft was able to apply its logic to the condition of women in the home as well 
as to that of citizens outside of it.   
III 
In a straightforward sense, Wollstonecraft describes women as slaves.
44
 Being denied any 
civil and political rights, women were not able to act in their own right but were dependent on 
men. She illustrates this point vividly in her novel, Maria: 
a wife being as much a man’s property as his horse, or his ass, she has nothing which 
she can call her own… The tender mother cannot lawfully snatch from the gripe of the 
gambling spendthrift, or beastly drunkard, unmindful of his offspring, the fortune 
which falls to her by chance; or (so flagrant is the injustice) what she earns by her 
own exertions. No; he can rob her with impunity, even to waste publicly on a 
courtezan; and the laws of her country – if women have a country – afford her no 
protection or redress.
45
 
Not all women were so unhappy but all were equally slaves since the power over them was 
arbitrary. Many women may, of course, had kind husbands or fathers who would not have 
acted in the same way as Maria’s husband. And many others, by using their cunning, their 
charms or their talents might have been able to avoid unwanted interference and gain a 
degree of control over their lives. They could not, however, have done so as a matter of right, 
acting in their own names. From a republican perspective, as well as from Wollstonecraft’s 
own, this element of entitlement marked the difference between independence and 
dependence, or in this sense, between freedom and slavery.
46
 If women do not control their 
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own earnings or property, for example, by right, they are not men’s equals and must therefore 
depend on luck or circumstance for their continued security. This status inequality between 
men and women, as we have seen, is corrupting and undermines civic virtue across society. 
Since no woman, regardless of education, class or position, could be independent, no woman 
could be said to be free.
47
 In her substantive analysis of social relations, it is true that 
Wollstonecraft is sensitive to the complex ways individuals – and not just women, but 
including, for example, poor working men and religious Dissenters – may be dominated.48 
Nevertheless, as I shall show, the longevity of women’s subjection, the effects of which seem 
to be transmitted to posterity, stem from the manner in which they are as a class considered 
slaves.  
In addition to their legal and political exclusion, women were dominated through 
another source of arbitrary power which prevented them from acting in their own right. The 
customs, traditions and opinions – including ideas about women’s natures, expectations about 
decent and proper conduct, preconceptions about the separate realms of public and private 
life, the sexual division of labour – which made up the background culture in which 
Wollstonecraft lived combined to keep women dependent on men no less effectively than did 
the law. Not only did these beliefs and values not reflect women’s interests, since they did not 
have sufficient authority or influence, women were left without an effective voice with which 
to bring about cultural change. It is sometimes said that Wollstonecraft had come to regard 
her society’s identification of the female sex with certain characteristics of delicacy, purity 
and weakness as a prison for women.
49
 And while this is a metaphor that Wollstonecraft 
sometimes employs, the image of confinement does not fully capture nature of women’s 
social oppression that she identified.
50
 Women were not simply restricted in the actions they 
were able to perform. They were kept in a state of dependence through the effects of these 
beliefs and practices. Wollstonecraft frequently uses the language of slavery in respect of this 
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social subjection. For example, Maria’s friend and prison warder, Jemima, speaks of ‘being 
born a slave’ because of the prejudice she experienced for having an unwed mother. She had 
been, she said, ‘chained by infamy to slavery.’51  
Social domination represents an especially subtle, pervasive and powerful form of 
oppression. Wollstonecraft identifies the belief that women were ‘created rather to feel than 
reason’ as the source of the endless variety of ‘meanness, cares and sorrows into which 
women are plunged.’52 She describes the resulting bondage as a specious form of ‘slavery 
which chains the very soul of woman’ and which takes a ‘Herculean’ effort to shake off.53 
Whereas poor and unpropertied men (‘hard-working mechanics’) lack legal rights and 
political representation, only women face the ‘insuperable obstacles’ of social domination.54 
In describing women as being dominated socially, it should be emphasized that domination, 
as a master-slave relationship, always represents a relation between agents, either 
individually or acting in concert.
55
 To argue that women are slaves in virtue of their social 
background is not to imply that they are controlled in some abstract way by an impersonal 
system or force, as some might interpret an idea of a Volksgeist or collective controlling mind 
of a people. As Wollstonecraft makes clear, individually women were dominated even if this 
was in virtue of characteristics they shared with other women as a group. And individual men 
possessed a controlling power over women.
56
 Nevertheless, power need not be directly 
attributable to any particular person’s will or actions for it to be dominating. The crucial 
factor is that, ultimately, in virtue of the majority opinion or a prevailing background attitude, 
some agents (men) are able to exercise an arbitrary control over the actions of others 
(women).
57
  
Wollstonecraft outlines several ways in which social power is dominating. First, 
women’s legal and political marginalization was more easily maintained where it was 
believed to be natural or proper. Where, for example, women were seen as being ‘fragile in 
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every sense of the word’ and so ‘obliged to look up to man for every comfort’ who served as 
‘their natural protector,’ the strictness of the marriage laws and the principles of coverture 
were seen to make sense and could be justified.
58
 This gave rise to a second source of 
dependence which was that many professions and social opportunities by which women 
might support themselves and establish their own independence were foreclosed to them.
59
 
Beyond this, Wollstonecraft also emphasizes how social attitudes compelled women to act as 
self-censors, guarding their every action in order to keep up appropriate appearances. For 
example, she says that a woman’s overarching imperative was to protect her reputation for 
modesty at all costs. If she lost her reputation, she lost her place in society entirely and 
became, in effect, ‘an outlaw’ without protection.60 The stakes were so high that rather than 
taking risks and developing their talents and abilities beyond what was socially ascribed, 
women would, overwhelmingly, conform to the appropriate standards rather than drawing 
attention to themselves.
61
 A fourth reason is the focus of the next section. The strength and 
tenacity of social pressure as a distinctive form of dominating power, I argue, lies in the way 
in which citizen’s capacity to reason is undermined, leaving victims entirely at the mercy of 
their masters.  
IV 
In order to be independent, individuals must be in a position to defend themselves from 
arbitrary power. To do so, they must be able to argue their case rationally, making use of 
considerations accepted by all as being relevant.
62
 However, Wollstonecraft demonstrates that 
even where a woman could demonstrate that she had the requisite rational virtues (and she 
concedes that under conditions of slavery, this was not always the case), she was unlikely to 
be given a fair hearing irrespective of the strength of her arguments. Two reasons emerge. 
First, women themselves were not regarded as suitable dialogue partners with credible 
opinions and perspectives of their own. Secondly, where arguments are given which depart 
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from the accepted position, they are more likely to be dismissed. The following incident 
taken from Maria illustrates both of these difficulties.  
Having been imprisoned in a lunatic asylum by her abusive, neglectful and dishonest 
husband, Maria eventually elopes with her lover, Henry Darnford. Her husband later sues 
Darnford for seduction, and Maria, somewhat improbably, takes it upon herself to conduct 
her lover’s defence. Although she is not allowed to speak in person, she presents her case in 
writing to the court. The judge dismisses her testimony out of hand, citing the ‘fallacy of 
letting women plead their feelings as an excuse for the violation of the marriage-vow.’ Not 
only were women deemed unreliable, but allowing them to speak was thought to open a 
‘flood-gate for immorality.’63 The case was lost, for there were no witnesses other than Maria 
herself. Indeed her statement was considered suspect by the very fact that she was testifying 
against her husband. Unable to persuade anyone to listen to her, Maria found herself at the 
mercy of the judicial system and the men in whose power she was.
64
 Unlike a man, Maria 
was ‘doubly deauthorized’ as a witness, finding herself discounted on account of both who 
she was and the claims she made.
65
 Furthermore, as Wollstonecraft makes clear, even where 
a woman’s testimony is accepted on its facts, the negative effect of background opinions and 
beliefs will remain in the form of a wider moral condemnation. In court, for example, Maria 
was accused of corrupting the institution of marriage and opening the door to the degradation 
of public decency. Such behaviour may have been permitted in France it was said, but not in 
England. This moral reaction both to what Maria said and that it was a woman saying it 
represented a further barrier to being taken seriously. 
In part, the reaction to Maria’s testimony can be explained by the tendency for virtue 
to be corrupted in hierarchical or patriarchal societies, leading men to flatter themselves that 
they are superior and to defend vested interests rather than objectively to listen to unfamiliar 
arguments with an open mind.
66
 Beyond this, however, Wollstonecraft identifies a deeper 
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obstacle to women’s voices being heard. Throughout her writing, she takes note of the effect 
people’s social environment has on their behaviour, outlook and capacity for virtue.67 These 
background features influence and determine the available stock of knowledge, ideas and 
attitudes upon which individual reasoners are able to draw. As they grow up, she argues, 
people tend to acquire ‘prejudices’ based on the ideas and attitudes to which they are 
exposed. In itself, a prejudice need not be a harmful attitude. It is simply ‘a fond obstinate 
persuasion for which we can give no reason.’68 Indeed, very often there may have been a 
perfectly reasonable, practical reason why things have come to be seen or done in a certain 
way.
69
 Over time, however, the original context comes to be forgotten whereas the tradition it 
generated becomes entrenched. And so, ‘opinions assume the disproportionate form of 
prejudices when they are indolently adopted only because age has given them a venerable 
aspect, though the reason on which they were built ceases to be a reason, or cannot be traced.’ 
As prejudices become deeply rooted they have a tendency to ‘cloud reason,’ misrepresenting 
what is in reality a particular, culturally-specific set of possibilities as simply the way things 
are and allowing spurious arguments in favour of the status quo to take precedence over hard-
fought intellectual endeavour.  
As Wollstonecraft understands it, the public deliberation upon which the defence 
against dependence relies always takes place within a social setting. Background ideas, 
beliefs, myths and traditions come to form a system of cultural attitudes and values which 
supply the common stock of standards and concepts used by citizens to frame their own 
arguments and evaluate the arguments of others. Ominously, however, it is often those in 
power who control and influence the ideas which shape this background. Wollstonecraft 
illustrates this point with the creation story in Genesis where Eve is formed from Adam’s rib, 
arguing that men have played upon their superior physical strength to legitimate and 
perpetuate the mythical idea that the current relative gender-ordering was ordained by both 
17 
 
God and nature.
70
 She also notes the enormous influence that respected writers have in 
forming public opinions about the place of women.
71
 The outcome is that a baseline of 
commonly accepted ideas and values is established which is biased towards the perspectives 
of the dominant social. As a result, rather than deliberating in a reasoned and impartial 
manner, Wollstonecraft observes that ‘men in general seem to employ their reason to justify 
prejudices, which they have imbibed, they cannot trace how, rather than to root them out.’72 
This represents a very serious impediment to the republican ideal of public debate as a 
safeguard against domination. And so, while Wollstonecraft acknowledges the power of 
reason to expose error and injustice, she questions its effectiveness amongst a people whose 
customs and attitudes about what is right or fitting frequently rested upon ‘on a chaotic mass 
of prejudices that have no inherent principle of order to keep them together.’73  
In identifying the influence of the social background, Wollstonecraft has done more 
than describe the effects of cultural attitudes and expectations on the ways we judge the 
arguments and opinions of others. Through her description of individuals as slaves in virtue 
of their social environment, a complex argument emerges which both diagnoses the structure 
of cultural oppression in terms of freedom as non-domination whilst highlighting a crucial 
difference between legal and social forms of servitude. Reasoned argument is supposed to 
serve as a bulwark against arbitrary power. Even the law, to which all are subject, is itself 
open to the external and independent scrutiny of reason since it should reflect the common 
interests of the people as determined through rational public deliberation. Where citizens 
have access to deliberative argument in their defence, then even where they are formally 
dominated the possibility remains that they may expose the injustice of their situation. By 
highlighting their situation within civil society, for example, it may be possible to lobby for a 
change in the law. Such a defence, however, has no realistic chance of success where 
prejudice has clouded the ability to reason of the judges and fellow deliberators. As a result, a 
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fundamental check on arbitrary power is disarmed. Deliberation takes place against a 
background of accepted norms and de facto institutional practices, in which current structures 
of power and ways of life are taken as the neutral order of things. When outside voices 
challenge the values and received opinions of the baseline, their arguments are typically 
judged, not according to ‘the best reasons’ objectively conceived, but by the (arbitrary) 
strength of prevailing public opinion. Questions such as whose testimony is credible, which 
facts are relevant, and what normative considerations apply are determined from the 
perspective of the dominant social groups.
74
 Consequently, men became the ultimate arbiters 
as to what was admissible in public discussion and what counted as a reasonable argument. 
There was no external, moderating influence to which women could appeal since the public’s 
capacity to reason impartially had been contaminated. Under such conditions, it is often 
impossible for those perceived to be outsiders to challenge the entrenched, status quo position 
where their own arguments are too far from the dominant ideas to be seriously entertained.  
Where individuals have the legal right to contest and challenge arbitrary power, they 
do so using the rules of reasoned debate as these are socially understood. However, where 
there is social domination, people face the additional task of challenging the public 
understanding of what those generally accepted rules are. It is no longer a case of contesting 
power using reason as an independent medium but of asking for the medium itself to be 
redefined and agreed by all those who use it. The reliance on reasoned argument as a defence 
against arbitrary power requires a reasonably representative social background in order for it 
to operate correctly. Since it is a feature of human psychology that we unthinkingly absorb 
many of our ideas from our surroundings, it is, of course, unrealistic for prejudice to be 
eliminated altogether. It is, therefore, essential that citizens have the means of negating or 
countering prejudice through exercizing their own cultural voice. And since societies are 
dynamic entities, this is an on-going requirement. As conditions change – for example, as 
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power shifts after war, as the economy develops, as urban centres become more populous, as 
technology changes work patterns, or as religious beliefs alter – latent prejudices from 
previous generations need to be re-examined to minimize the impact on the current citizens. 
Rather than traditions becoming ‘moss-covered’ and entrenched, serving to further the 
interests of the established powers, the culture must be open enough to accommodate the 
possibility of social change.  
V 
Nobody is exempt from the influence of their environment. Even people of ‘genius,’ 
Wollstonecraft argues, ‘have always been blurred by the prejudices of the age.’75 More 
generally, she observes that all ‘men and women,’ are inevitably shaped ‘in a great degree, by 
the opinions and manners of the society they live in. In every age there has been a stream of 
popular opinion that has carried all before it.’76 And even enlightened, open-minded 
individuals, she believes, rarely ‘perceive how much they themselves are indebted to general 
improvement for the acquirements, and even the virtues, which they would not have had the 
force of mind to attain, by their individual exertions in a less advanced state of society.’77 
This is not to say, however, that we are simply products of our culture. As rational and moral 
beings we are responsible for our actions and our opinions. And so ‘whatever effect 
circumstances, have on our abilities, individuals are nevertheless, capable of becoming 
virtuous by the exercise of [their] own reason.’78  
Even where individuals are able to transcend their circumstances and become 
virtuous, however, they cannot be independent until there is social equality. Until their 
interests are reflected amongst the considerations that form the background against which 
reasoned debate is conducted and they can make their perspectives understood and be taken 
seriously, such virtuous individuals will not be able to contest and challenge arbitrary power. 
Wollstonecraft’s position is more far-reaching than calling for the extension of a set of civil 
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and political ‘rights of man’ to include women as well. If women are to be genuinely free, she 
argues, there must be a wholesale ‘revolution in female manners.’79 This revolution goes 
beyond calling for a change in women’s behaviour (though Wollstonecraft believes the 
‘exquisite sensibility and sweet docility’ that women tended to display was harmful to their 
prospects for independence).
80
 Although change would be initiated through individual virtue, 
by reforming themselves, she argues, women would go on to ‘reform the world.’ As Daniel 
O’Neill puts it, the revolution in female manners would require a ‘radical transformation of 
political, economic, social, and gender relations.’81  
Not only must the whole social and institutional order be restructured, it must be 
rebuilt by both men and women working together. So, for example, while Wollstonecraft 
emphasizes the importance of education in developing an individual’s potential, women must 
be involved in determining the content and scope of that education (she notes, for example, 
that the ‘false system of education’ which is said to lie at the root of women’s subjection has 
been bolstered through books on the subject written by men).
82
 Education, of course, is only 
one aspect of civil life (‘till society be differently constituted, much cannot be expected from 
education.’)83 Beyond this, women must play a full part in all aspects of public life – in the 
professions, positions of influence, and government. By interacting with others socially, 
Wollstonecraft argues, we ‘are obliged to examine our prejudices, and often imperceptibly 
lose’ them.84 Very often, women’s very presence in a situation from which they had 
previously been excluded will begin to breakdown stereotypes and help redefine the way 
they, as women, are seen. And so, ultimately, by taking part in those social activities which 
shape public attitudes – including politics, agriculture, commerce, literature and even war – 
women can generate social change. In this way, women, as well as men, will be able to 
‘scatter the seeds’ that will eventually reshape public opinion and, in the end, bring forward 
the ‘overthrow of arbitrary power.’ 
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Creating cultural change, of course, is not easy. Nor will it be quickly brought about. 
Wollstonecraft is aware that ‘the changing of customs of long standing require[s] more 
energy’ than citizens often possess and that ‘it will require a considerable length of time to 
eradicate the firmly rooted prejudices which sensualists have implanted.’85 This is not least 
because of the scale of the problem to be overcome. In addition to the prejudices themselves, 
there are the structural obstacles which hold them in place that we have discussed, including 
patterns of social and political dependence, the corruption of civic virtue, and an inadequate 
access to education and positions of influence. Nevertheless, recognizing all of this, 
Wollstonecraft remains confident in the ability of women to improve themselves and, over 
time, to bring about a revolution in manners. It may take time, she says, to overcome ‘the 
inertia of reason; but, when it is once in motion, fables, once held sacred, may be ridiculed’ 
and a new social world can be constructed.
86
 
Concluding remarks 
While the idea of initiating cultural change might sound utopian, the importance of 
Wollstonecraft’s arguments lies in the structure she provides for understanding social 
freedom. Where republicans have relied on public deliberation based on a combination of 
reason and commonly accepted considerations to identify and challenge arbitrary power, 
Wollstonecraft shows that this can only be effective where there already is social equality. 
The considerations which frame public arguments must reflect the input and interests of both 
men and women if they are to be non-arbitrary. In highlighting the role of social factors in 
domination, I have not intended to downplay the importance Wollstonecraft places on 
political reform and formal independence as a legal person in one’s own right.87  And clearly 
legal and social factors often work together in reinforcing and prolonging oppression. 
Nevertheless, these two kinds of domination constitute distinct evils, attributable to different 
sources of arbitrary power. It has been my argument that where domination is social, its 
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harms can be particularly seditious in undermining the victims’ recourse to reason to uncover 
and expose the extent of their dominated state. 
Although I have not had the space to apply her analysis beyond its original context of 
women’s subjection, I believe Wollstonecraft’s arguments generalize to address the wider 
question of the social marginalization of all excluded minorities. Her examination of the 
interrelation between the legal-political and social-cultural spheres of communal life shows 
how domination within one area cannot be adequately addressed without simultaneous 
changes in the other. And while few contemporary republicans would deny that social factors 
do influence freedom and the effectiveness of legal reform, Wollstonecraft offers a 
framework within which this interconnectivity can be tackled, structuring both around the 
principle of freedom as non-domination. She also offers a model of what genuine 
independence requires. In order to act as equal partners, jointly conducting the business of 
state, individuals must be taken seriously as dialogue partners and as agents. The task of 
enabling all citizens to share in an equal social freedom is one which faces all culturally 
plural societies. By applying the conception of independence in the light of social conditions 
Wollstonecraft has enlarged the traditional ideal and shown the magnitude of what is required 
if all citizens are to be able to enjoy a genuine freedom from both legal and social oppression. 
Independence requires more than formal equality. Citizens from all social groups and 
backgrounds must interact on a basis which reflects the ideas and values of all sections of 
society. There must be sufficient provision to empower individuals to help reshape the 
common understandings, traditions, beliefs and social intuitions against which their actions 
are understood socially. For without social parity of this sort, as Wollstonecraft shows, the 
effects of servitude have the potential to be transmitted to posterity. 
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